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Abstract
We study the problem of private set intersection (PSI). In this problem, there are
two entities Ei, for i = 1, 2, each storing a set Pi, whose elements are picked from a finite
field FK , on Ni replicated and non-colluding databases. It is required to determine the
set intersection P1∩P2 without leaking any information about the remaining elements
to the other entity, and to do this with the least amount of downloaded bits. We
first show that the PSI problem can be recast as a multi-message symmetric private
information retrieval (MM-SPIR) problem with certain added restrictions. Next, as
a stand-alone result, we derive the information-theoretic sum capacity of MM-SPIR,
CMM−SPIR. We show that with K messages, N databases, and the size of the desired
message set P , the exact capacity of MM-SPIR is CMM−SPIR = 1−
1
N
when P ≤ K−1,
provided that the entropy of the common randomness S satisfies H(S) ≥ P
N−1 per
desired symbol. When P = K, the MM-SPIR capacity is trivially 1 without the need for
any common randomness S. This result implies that there is no gain for MM-SPIR over
successive single-message SPIR (SM-SPIR). For the MM-SPIR problem, we present a
novel capacity-achieving scheme which builds seamlessly over the near-optimal scheme
of Banawan-Ulukus originally proposed for the multi-message PIR (MM-PIR) problem
without any database privacy constraints. Surprisingly, our scheme here is exactly
optimal for the MM-SPIR problem for any P , in contrast to the scheme for the MM-
PIR problem, which was proved only to be near-optimal. Our scheme is an alternative
to the successive usage of the SM-SPIR scheme of Sun-Jafar. Based on this capacity
result for the MM-SPIR problem, and after addressing the added requirements in its
conversion to the PSI problem, we show that the optimal download cost for the PSI
problem is given by min
{⌈
P1N2
N2−1
⌉
,
⌈
P2N1
N1−1
⌉}
, where Pi is the cardinality of set Pi.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 17-13977 and ECCS 18-07348.
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1 Introduction
The private set intersection (PSI) problem refers to the problem of determining the common
elements in two sets (lists) without leaking any further information about the remaining ele-
ments in the sets. This problem has been a major research topic in the field of cryptography
starting with the work [1] (see also [2–4]). In all these works, computational guarantees are
used to ensure the privacy of the elements beyond the intersection. The PSI problem can be
motivated by many practical examples, for instance: Consider an airline company which has
a list of its customers, and a law enforcement agency which has a list of suspected terrorists.
The airline company and the law enforcement agency wish to determine the intersection of
their respective lists without the airline company revealing the rest of its customers and the
law enforcement agency revealing the rest of the suspects in its list. As another example,
consider a major service provider (e.g., Whatsapp) and a new customer who wishes to join
this service. The user wishes to find out which members of his/her contact list are already
using this service without revealing his/her entire contact list to the service provider. Sim-
ilarly, the service provider wishes to determine the intersection without revealing its entire
list of customers. For other examples, please see [2, 3].
Since the entities in PSI want to privately retrieve the elements that belong to the in-
tersection of their sets P1 ∩ P2, where Pi is the set (list) that belongs to the ith entity,
private information retrieval (PIR) can be used as a building block for the PSI problem. In
classical PIR, which was introduced by Chor et al. [5], a user wants to retrieve a message
(file) from distributed databases without leaking any information about the identity of the
desired file. This is desirable in the PSI problem, as one of the entities wants to retrieve the
intersection P1 ∩ P2. Nevertheless, it is needed to keep the remaining elements of the sets
secret from the other entity, i.e., the first entity wants to keep the set P1\P2 from the second
entity and vice versa. This gives rise naturally to the problem of symmetric PIR (SPIR),
which was originally introduced in [6], where the retrieval scheme needs to ensure that the
user learns no information beyond the desired message. This extra requirement is called the
database privacy constraint, which is in addition to the usual user privacy constraint in PIR.
Recently, Sun and Jafar reformulated the problems of PIR and SPIR from an information-
theoretic point of view, and determined the fundamental limits of both of these problems,
i.e., their capacity, in [7] and [8], respectively. Subsequently, the fundamental limits of many
interesting variants of PIR and SPIR have been considered, see for example [9–62].
Now, to use SPIR to implement PSI, the ith entity needs to privately check the presence
of each element in Pi at the other entity. That is, the ith entity needs to retrieve the
occurrences of all elements that belong to its set Pi from the other entity. This implies
that the ith entity needs to retrieve multiple messages from the other entity, where the
messages here correspond to the incidences of each element of the set Pi. This establishes
the connection between the PSI problem and the multi-message SPIR (MM-SPIR) problem.
Apart from the PSI problem, the MM-SPIR problem is interesting on its own right and
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has remained an open problem until this work. Reference [23] investigates the problem of
multi-message PIR (MM-PIR) without any database privacy constraints. The results of [23]
show that the user can improve the retrieval rate by jointly retrieving the desired messages
instead of retrieving them one-by-one. In this paper, we aim to characterize the capacity
of the MM-SPIR problem as a stand-alone result, and determine whether the MM-SPIR
capacity is larger than the single-message SPIR (SM-SPIR) capacity. Second, we aim to
unify the achievability schemes of MM-PIR and MM-SPIR so that the query structure can
be maintained with and without the database privacy constraints.
The papers that are most closely related to our work are the ones that focus on symmetry
and multi-message aspects of PIR. Reference [8] derives the SPIR capacity when the user
wishes to retrieve a single message as CSM−SPIR = 1−
1
N
. Reference [23] considers MM-PIR
and determines the exact capacity when the number of desired messages P is at least half of
the total number of messages K or when K/P is an integer; for all other cases [23] provides
a novel PIR scheme which is near-optimal. Reference [35] studies multi-server MM-PIR with
private side information. References [36,37] study single-server MM-PIR with side informa-
tion. Reference [13] studies SPIR from MDS-coded databases. The problem is extended to
include colluding servers in [14] and mismatches between message and common randomness
codes in [15]. Reference [16] investigates SPIR in the presence of adversaries. Reference [17]
characterizes the tradeoff between the minimum download cost and the information leakage
from undesired messages. None of these works considers the interplay between the data
privacy constraint and the joint retrieval of multiple messages, as needed in MM-SPIR.
In this paper, first focusing on MM-SPIR as a stand-alone problem, we derive its capac-
ity. Our results show that the sum capacity of MM-SPIR is exactly equal to the capacity of
SM-SPIR, i.e., CSM−PIR = CMM−PIR = 1 −
1
N
. We show that the databases need to share
a random variable S such that H(S) ≥ P
N−1
per desired symbol, which is P multiple of the
common randomness required for SM-SPIR. This implies that, unlike MM-PIR, there is no
gain from jointly retrieving the P messages, and it suffices to download the P messages suc-
cessively using the SM-SPIR scheme in [8], provided that statistically independent common
randomness symbols are used at each time. For the extreme case P = K, i.e., when the user
wants to retrieve all messages, the problem reduces to SPIR with K = 1 message, where
the database privacy and the user privacy constraints are trivially satisfied and full capacity
(i.e., CMM−SPIR = 1) is attained without the need for any common randomness.
Further, for MM-SPIR, we propose a novel capacity-achieving scheme for 1 ≤ P ≤ K−1.
Compared with the one in [8], the form of this achievable scheme is much closer to the
achievable scheme in [7]. The query structure of the scheme resembles its counterpart in [23],
in particular, we construct the greedy algorithm in [7] backwards as in [23]. The major
difference between our proposed scheme here and the MM-PIR scheme in [23] is the fact
that databases add the common randomness to the returned answer strings to satisfy the
database privacy constraint. Our scheme is surprisingly optimal for all P and K in contrast
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to the scheme in [23] which is proved to be optimal only if P is at least half of K or K/P is an
integer. By plugging P = 1, our scheme serves as an alternative capacity-achieving scheme
for the SM-SPIR scheme in [8]. As an added advantage, our scheme extends seamlessly
the MM-PIR scheme to satisfy the database privacy constraint without changing the query
structure. Hence, by operating such a scheme the databases can support SPIR and PIR
simultaneously. Moreover, the scheme may serve as a stepping stone to solve some other
SPIR problems, such as, SM-SPIR or MM-SPIR with side information.
In this paper, we ultimately consider the PSI problem. There are two entities E1 and
E2. The entity Ei has a set (list) Pi, whose elements are picked from a finite field FK and
has a cardinality Pi. The set Pi is stored on Ni non-colluding and replicated databases. It is
required to compute the intersection P1 ∩ P2 without leaking information about P1 \ P2 or
P2 \ P1 with the minimum download cost. We first show that this problem can be recast as
an MM-SPIR problem, where a user needs to retrieve P messages from a library containing
K messages. In this MM-SPIR problem, messages correspond to incidences of elements
in these sets with respect to the field elements. Specifically, the entity Ei constructs the
incidence vector of its elements with respect to the field elements. The incidence vector is a
binary vector of length K that stores a 1 in the position of the jth element of the field if this
field element is in Pi. This transforms each set into a library of K binary messages (of length
1 bit each). This transformation is needed since in SPIR, a user needs to know the location
of the file(s) in the databases. Therefore, in transforming the PSI problem into an MM-SPIR
problem, two restrictions arise: First, the message size is fixed and finite, which is 1 in this
case. Second, depending on the model assumed regarding the generation of sets P1 and P2,
the messages may be correlated. In our formulation, the message size is 1, but the messages
are independent; see the exact problem formulation. Following these constructions, entity
Ei performs MM-SPIR of the messages corresponding to its set Pi within the databases of
the other entity. By decoding these messages, the intersection P1∩P2 is determined without
leaking any information about P1 \ P2 or P2 \ P1. This is a direct consequence of satisfying
the reliability, user privacy, and database privacy constraints of the MM-SPIR problem. We
show that the optimum download cost of the PSI problem is min
{⌈
P1N2
N2−1
⌉
,
⌈
P2N1
N1−1
⌉}
, which
is linear in the size of the smaller set, i.e., min{P1, P2}. The linear scaling appears in the
problem of determining the set intersection even without any privacy constraints.
2 PSI: Problem Formulation
Consider the problem of privately determining the intersection of two sets (or lists) picked
from a finite field1 FK . Consider a setting where there are two entities E1 and E2. For
1The restriction of picking the set from a finite field is without loss of generality as the set elements of
any kind can be mapped into corresponding field elements for sufficiently large field size. For example, the
elements of the set of the names of suspected terrorists in the United States can be mapped into elements
from the finite field FK , where K is the population size of the United States.
4
fg
h
a
c
e
f
g
h
a
e
f
g
h
Decodera c
a a a
c c c
b b b
e jf g h i
b da c
DB N2DB 1 DB 2
Q
[P1]
1 Q
[P1]
2 Q
[P1]
N2
. . .
c
a
E2
d
E1
A
[P1]
2
A
[P1]
N2
A
[P1]
1
DB 1 DB 2 DB N1
. . .
dd
c
e
Figure 1: Example for the private set intersection (PSI) problem. E1 has the set P1 =
{a, b, c, d} and E2 has the set P2 = {a, c, e, f, g, h}. E1 submits queries to E2 that do not leak
information about P1, while E2 responds with answers that do not leak information about
e, f, g, h (or non-existence of i, j). By decoding the answers, E1 learns that P1∩P2 = {a, c}.
i = 1, 2, the entity Ei stores a set Pi. For each element of the finite field FK , the entity
Ei adds
2 this element to its set Pi independently from the remaining field elements with
probability qi. In this work, we focus on the case of qi =
1
2
for i = 1, 2. After generation of
the set Pi, the cardinality of Pi ⊆ F
Pi
K is denoted by |Pi| = Pi, and is public knowledge. The
entity Ei stores Pi in a replicated fashion on Ni non-colluding databases.
The entities E1 and E2 want to compute the intersection P1∩P2 privately (see Fig. 1). To
that end, the entity3 E1 sends N2 queries to the databases associated with E2. Specifically,
E1 sends the query Q
[P1]
n2 to the n2th database for all n2 ∈ [N2], where [N2] (and also [1 : N2])
denotes integers from 1 to N2. Since E1 does not know P2 in advance, it generates the
queries Q
[P1]
1:N2
=
{
Q
[P1]
n2 : n2 ∈ [N2]
}
independently from P2, hence,
I(Q
[P1]
1:N2
;P2) = 0 (1)
2We note that our achievability scheme works for any statistical distribution imposed on the sets, i.e.,
the i.i.d. generation assumption presented here is not needed for the achievability proof.
3The entities E1, E2 should agree on a specific order of retrieval operations such that this order results in
the minimal download cost. Without loss of generality, we assume here that the optimal order of operation
starts with entity E1 sending queries to the databases associated with entity E2.
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The databases associated with E2 respond truthfully with answer strings A
[P1]
1:N2
={
A
[P1]
n2 : n2 ∈ [N2]
}
. The n2th answer string A
[P1]
n2 is a deterministic function of the set P2
and the query Q
[P1]
n2 , thus,
H(A[P1]n2 |Q
[P1]
n2
,P2) = 0, n2 ∈ [N2] (2)
Denote the cardinality of the intersection |P1 ∩ P2| by M . The entity
4 E1 should be
able to reliably compute the intersection P1∩P2 based on the collected answer strings A
[P1]
1:N2
without knowing M in advance. This is captured by the following PSI reliability constraint,
[PSI reliability] H(P1 ∩ P2|Q
[P1]
1:N2
, A
[P1]
1:N2
) = 0 (3)
The privacy requirements can be expressed as the following two privacy constraints: E1
privacy and E2 privacy. First, the queries sent by E1 should not leak any information about
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P1, i.e., any individual database associated with E2 learns nothing about P1 from the queries,
[E1 privacy] I(P1;Q
[P1]
n2
) = 0, n2 ∈ [N2] (4)
Second, E1 should not be able to learn anything further than P1∩P2 from the collected answer
strings, i.e., E1 should not learn the elements in P2 other than the intersection, P2\(P1∩P2) =
P2 \ P1. Moreover
6, E1 should not learn the absence of the remaining field elements in E2,
i.e., the set (P1 ∪ P2). Thus, E1 should learn nothing about (P2 \ P1) ∪ (P1 ∪ P2) = P¯1,
[E2 privacy] I(P¯1;A
[P1]
1:N2
) = 0 (5)
For given field size K, set sizes P1 and P2, and number of databases N1 and N2, an
achievable PSI scheme is a scheme that satisfies the PSI reliability constraint (3), the E1
privacy constraint (4), and the E2 privacy constraint (5). The efficiency of the scheme is
measured by the total number of downloaded bits by one of the entities E1 or E2 in order
to compute P1 ∩ P2, denoted by D,
D =
N2∑
n2=1
H(A[P1]n2 ) (6)
The optimal download cost is D∗ = infD over all achievable PSI schemes.
4After calculating P1 ∩ P2 at E1, the entity E1 sends the result of P1 ∩ P2 directly to E2 if needed.
5While checking the presence of elements of P1 in P2, E1 wants to protect P1 \ P2. However, since E1
does not know P2, the queries cannot depend on P2 (see also (1)), and E1 should protect all of P1 in queries.
6Although it is tempting to formulate the E2 privacy constraint as I(P2 \ P1;A
[P1]
1:N2
) = 0, this constraint
permits leaking information about the remaining field elements that do not exist in P2. More specifically, if
we adopted this constraint in the example in Fig. 1, the answers should not leak information about e, f, g, h,
however, E1 may learn that the elements i, j do not exist in P2. To properly formalize the constraint that
E1 learns nothing other than the intersection, we need to protect (P1 ∪ P2) as well.
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Figure 2: Example for the transformation from sets to incidence vectors. E1 has the
set P1 = {a, b, c, d} and E2 has the set P2 = {a, c, e, f, g, h}. The alphabet is Palph =
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j}. Entity Ei constructs an incidence vector Xi to facilitate MM-SPIR.
3 From PSI to MM-SPIR
In this section, we show that the PSI problem can be reduced to an MM-SPIR problem, if
the entities allow storing their sets in a specific searchable format. This transformation has
the same flavor as [63] and [42], where the original contents of the databases are mapped
into searchable lists to enable PIR, which assumes that the user knows the position of the
desired file in the databases. To that end, define the incidence vector Xi ∈ F
K
2 as a binary
vector of size K associated with the set Pi. Denote the jth element of the incidence vector
Xi by Xi(j) where
Xi(j) =

1, j ∈ Pi0, j /∈ Pi (7)
for all j ∈ FK . Hence, Xi(j) is an i.i.d. random variable for all j ∈ [K] such that Xi(j) ∼
Ber(qi). The entity Ei constructs the incidence vector Xi corresponding to the set Pi (see
Fig. 2). The entity Ei replicates the vector Xi at all of its Ni associated databases (see
Fig. 3). Note that Xi is a sufficient statistic for Pi for a given K. The PSI determination
process is performed over X1 or X2, and not over the original P1 or P2.
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Figure 3: Example for the transformation from the PSI problem to an MM-SPIR problem.
E1 needs to retrieve the elements corresponding to P1 from the incidence vector X2 without
revealing P1, while E2 responds with answer strings that do not leak P¯1.
To solidify ideas, we state the variables defined so far explicitly over a specific example.
Consider the example in Fig. 1. Here, the entity E1 has the set P1 = {a, b, c, d} and the
entity E2 has the set P2 = {a, c, e, f, g, h}. Therefore, the intersection is P1 ∩ P2 = {a, c}.
Let us assume that the alphabet, Palph, for this example is Palph = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j} as
shown in Fig. 2. Then, the incidence vectors at the entities are X1 = [1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0] and
X2 = [1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0], which are also shown in Fig. 2. For this example, P1 = 4, P2 = 6,
K = 10, and M = 2. Finally, the MM-SPIR is conducted over the replicated incidence
vectors at the two entities as shown in Fig. 3.
Without loss of generality, assume that E1 initiates the PSI process. E1 does not know
M in advance. The only information E1 has is P1. Consequently, E1 wants to verify the
existence of each element of P1 in P2 to deduce P1 ∩ P2. Thus, E1 needs to jointly and
reliably download the bits WP1 = {X2(j) : j ∈ P1} by sending N2 queries to the databases
associated with E2 and collecting the corresponding answer strings. Hence, we can write the
reliability constraint as,
H(WP1 |Q
[P1]
1:N2
, A
[P1]
1:N2
) = 0 (8)
Since E1 is searching for the existence of all elements of P1 in P2 without leaking any in-
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formation about P1 to any individual database associated with E2, the E1 privacy constraint
in (4) dictates,
I(P1;Q
[P1]
n2
) = 0, n2 ∈ [N2] (9)
This is exactly the privacy constraint in the MM-PIR problem [23].
As the databases associated with E2 store X2 now, to ensure the E2 privacy constraint
in (5), the answers from E2 databases should not leak any information about P¯1, which can
be further mapped to not leaking any information about WP¯1 = {X2(j) : j /∈ P1} as,
I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
1:N2
) = 0 (10)
This is exactly the database privacy constraint in MM-SPIR; see Section 5.1.
Consequently, the PSI problem formally reduces to MM-SPIR with i.i.d. messages of
length 1 bit each (see Fig. 3), when the entities E1 and E2 are allowed to construct the cor-
responding incidence vectors for the original sets P1 and P2. The message length constraint
of 1 bit per message, i.e., H(Wk) = 1 for all k ∈ [K], comes due to messages representing
incidences in the SPIR problem. The i.i.d. property of the messages that we have here in
this paper is a consequence of the i.i.d. generation of the sets with probability qi, and it is
not true in general. In Section 5, we derive in detail the capacity of the MM-SPIR problem
(see also Section 6), which in turn gives the most efficient information-theoretic PSI scheme.
4 Main Result
In this section, we present our main result concerning the PSI problem. The result provides
the optimal (minimum) download cost for the PSI problem under the assumptions in Sec-
tions 2 and 3. The result is based on the optimal download cost of the MM-SPIR problem,
which is presented in detail in Section 5; see also Section 6.
Theorem 1 In the PSI problem, if the elements of the sets are added independently with
probability qi =
1
2
from a finite field of size K, and if the set P1 where |P1| = P1 is stored
among N1 databases and the set P2 where |P2| = P2 is stored among N2 databases, then the
optimal download cost is,
D∗ = min
{⌈
P1N2
N2 − 1
⌉
,
⌈
P2N1
N1 − 1
⌉}
(11)
The proof of Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the capacity result for MM-SPIR
presented in Section 5; see also Section 6. We have the following remarks.
Remark 1 The min term in Theorem 1 comes from the fact that either entity can initiate
the PSI determination process so that the overall download cost is minimized.
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Remark 2 Compared with the best-known result for PSI under computational guarantees [3],
assuming that P1 ≥ P2, and N1 = N2, our result O(P2) is only linear in the size of the
smaller set in contrast to O(P2 logP1) in [3]. Our result is private in information-theoretic
(absolute) sense and does not need any assumptions about the computational powers of the
entities. Furthermore, the achievable scheme is fairly simple and easy to implement compared
to the fully homomorphic encryption needed in [3]. The only drawback of our approach is
that it needs multiple non-colluding databases (N1 or N2 needs to be strictly larger than 1),
otherwise, our scheme is infeasible.
Remark 3 The linear scalability of our scheme matches the linear scalability of the best-
known set intersection algorithms without any privacy constraints.
Remark 4 We note that although our result is exact, i.e., is the capacity (in the sense of
matching achievability and converse proofs) under the assumptions of independent generation
model for the lists with qi =
1
2
, our scheme is achievable for any list generation model with
arbitrary qi (see Footnote 2).
5 MM-SPIR as a Stand-Alone Problem
In this section, we consider the MM-SPIR problem. We present the problem in a stand-alone
format, i.e., we present a formal problem description in Section 5.1, followed by the main
result in Section 5.2, the converse in Section 5.3, and a novel achievability in Section 5.4.
5.1 MM-SPIR: Formal Problem Description
There are N non-colluding databases each storing K i.i.d. messages. Each message is com-
posed of L i.i.d. and uniformly chosen symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. Then,
H(Wk) = L, k ∈ [K] (12)
H(W1:K) = KL (13)
In the MM-SPIR problem, our goal is to retrieve a set of messages WP out of the K
available messages without leaking any information regarding the index set P to any indi-
vidual database where P = {i1, i2, · · · , iP} ⊆ [K] such that its cardinality is |P| = P . This
is the user privacy constraint. In addition, our goal is to not retrieve any messages beyond
the desired set of messages WP . This is the database privacy constraint.
Following the SPIR formulation in [8], let F denote the randomness in the retrieving
strategy adopted by the user. Because of the user privacy constraint, F is a random variable
whose realization is only known to the user, but is unknown to the databases. A necessary
common randomness S must be shared among the N databases to satisfy the database
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privacy constraint. The random variable S is generated independent of the message set
W1:K . Similarly, F is independent of W1:K as the user does not know message realizations
in advance. Moreover, F and S are generated independently without knowing the desired
index set P. Then,
H(F , S,P,W1:K) = H(F) +H(S) +H(P) +H(W1:K) (14)
To perform MM-SPIR, a user generates one query Q
[P]
n for each database according to
the randomness F and then sends it to the nth database. Hence, the queries Q
[P]
1:N are
deterministic functions of F , i.e.,
H(Q
[P]
1 , Q
[P]
2 , · · · , Q
[P]
N |F) = 0, ∀P (15)
Combining (14) and (15), the queries are independent of the messages, i.e.,
I(Q
[P]
1:N ;W1:K) = 0 (16)
After receiving a query from the user, each database truthfully generates an answer string
based on the messages and the common randomness, hence,
H(A[P]n |Q
[P]
n ,W1:K , S) = 0, ∀n, ∀P (17)
After collecting all the answer strings from the N databases, the user should be able to
decode the desired messages WP reliably, therefore,
[reliability] H(WP |A
[P]
1:N , Q
[P]
1:N ,F)
(15)
= H(WP |A
[P]
1:N ,F) = 0, ∀P (18)
In order to protect the user’s privacy, the query generated to retrieve the set of messages
WP1 should be statistically indistinguishable from the one generated to retrieve the set of
messages WP2 where |P1| = |P2| = P , i.e.,
[user privacy] (Q[P1]n , A
[P1]
n ,W1:K , S) ∼ (Q
[P2]
n , A
[P2]
n ,W1:K , S), ∀n, ∀P1,P2 s.t. |Pi| = P
(19)
The user privacy constraint in (19) is equivalent to,
[user privacy] I(P;Q[P]n , A
[P]
n ,W1:K , S) = 0, ∀P (20)
In order to protect the databases’ privacy, the user should learn nothing aboutWP¯ which
is the complement of WP , i.e., WP¯ =W1:K\WP ,
[database privacy] I(WP¯ ;Q
[P]
1:N , A
[P]
1:N ,F) = 0, ∀P (21)
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An achievable MM-SPIR scheme is a scheme that satisfies the MM-SPIR reliability con-
straint (18), the user privacy constraint (19)-(20), and the database privacy constraint (21).
Following the definition of the sum retrieval rate of WP in [23], we define the sum retrieval
rate of MM-SPIR as,
RMM−SPIR =
H(WP)∑N
n=1H(A
[P]
n )
=
PL∑N
n=1H(A
[P]
n )
(22)
The sum capacity of MM-SPIR, CMM−SPIR, is the supremum of the sum retrieval rates
RMM−SPIR over all achievable schemes.
5.2 MM-SPIR: Main Results
Our stand-alone result for MM-SPIR is stated in the following theorem. We only consider
N ≥ 2 as SPIR is infeasible for N = 1.
Theorem 2 The MM-SPIR capacity for N ≥ 2, K ≥ 2, and P ≤ K, is given by,
CMM−SPIR =


1, P = K
1− 1
N
, 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1, H(S) ≥ PL
N−1
0, otherwise
(23)
The converse proof is given is Section 5.3, and the achievability proof is given in Sec-
tion 5.4. We have the following remarks concerning Theorem 2.
Remark 5 The result implies that the capacity of MM-SPIR is exactly the same as the
capacity of SM-SPIR [8]. Hence, there is no gain from joint retrieval in comparison to suc-
cessive single-message SPIR [8]. This in contrast to the gain in MM-PIR [23] in comparison
to successive single-message PIR [7]. MM-SPIR capacity expression in Theorem 2 inherits
all of the structural remarks from [8].
Remark 6 Similar to the SM-SPIR problem, we observe a threshold effect on the size of the
required common randomness. Specifically, we note that there is a minimal required size for
the common randomness above which the problem is feasible. This threshold is P times the
threshold in SM-SPIR. Using a common randomness in the amount of the threshold achieves
the full capacity, and there is no need to use any more randomness than the threshold.
Remark 7 For the extreme case of P = K, the SPIR capacity is 1 without using any
common randomness. This is due to the fact that the user privacy and the database privacy
constraints are trivially satisfied, and hence the user can simply download all of the messages
from one of the databases without using any common randomness.
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5.3 MM-SPIR: Converse Proof
In this section, we derive the converse for Theorem 2. In the converse proof, we focus on
the case P ≤ K − 1. Because when P = K, the trivial upper bound for the retrieval rate
R ≤ 1 and the trivial lower bound for the common randomness H(S) ≥ 0 suffice. Further,
we exclusively focus on the case K ≥ 3. When K = 1, we have P = 1, and the converse
trivially follows since P = K. When K = 2: If P = 2, the converse trivially follows from the
converse of P = K, and when P = 1, the converse follows from the converse of SM-SPIR [8].
Now, focusing on the case K ≥ 3, and P ≤ K − 1, the total number of possible choices
for the index set P is β =
(
K
P
)
≥ 3. Thus, there always exist at least three non-identical
index sets P1,P2,P3 such that |Pi| = P , i = 1, 2, 3.
To prove the converse of Theorem 2, we first need the following lemmas. Lemmas 1 are
2 are direct extensions to [8, Lemmas 1 and 2] to the setting of MM-SPIR. Lemma 1 simply
states that an answer string A
[P1]
n which is received at the user to retrieve WP1 has the same
size as A
[P2]
n , i.e., all answer strings are symmetric in length, even if we condition over the
desired message set WP1 . This lemma is a direct consequence of the user privacy constraint.
Lemma 1 (Symmetry)
H(A[P1]n |WP1 , Q
[P1]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n |WP1 , Q
[P2]
n ), ∀n, ∀P1,P2 s.t. P1 6= P2, |P1| = |P2| (24)
H(A[P1]n |Q
[P1]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ), ∀n, ∀P1,P2 s.t. P1 6= P2, |P1| = |P2| (25)
Proof: From the user privacy constraint (19), we have
H(A[P1]n ,WP1 , Q
[P1]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n ,WP1, Q
[P2]
n ) (26)
H(WP1, Q
[P1]
n ) = H(WP1, Q
[P2]
n ) (27)
Using the definition of conditional entropy H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y ) − H(Y ), we obtain (24).
The proof of (25) follows from the user privacy constraint as well with noting that
H(A
[P1]
n , Q
[P1]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) and H(A
[P1]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n ). 
Next, Lemma 2 states that knowing the user’s private randomness F does not help in
decreasing the uncertainty of the answer string A
[P]
n .
Lemma 2 (Effect of conditioning on user’s randomness)
H(A[P]n |WP ,F , Q
[P]
n ) = H(A
[P]
n |WP , Q
[P]
n ), ∀n, ∀P (28)
Proof: We start with the following mutual information,
I(A[P]n ;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) ≤ I(A
[P]
n ,W1:K , S;F|WP, Q
[P]
n ) (29)
= I(W1:K , S;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) + I(A
[P]
n ;F|W1:K, S,WP , Q
[P]
n ) (30)
13
= I(W1:K , S;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) + I(A
[P]
n ;F|W1:K, S, Q
[P]
n ) (31)
= I(W1:K , S;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) +H(A
[P]
n |W1:K , S, Q
[P]
n )
−H(A[P]n |F ,W1:K, S, Q
[P]
n ) (32)
= I(W1:K , S;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) (33)
≤ I(W1:K , S;F|WP, Q
[P]
n ) + I(WP ;F|Q
[P]
n ) (34)
= I(W1:K ,WP , S;F|Q
[P]
n ) (35)
= I(W1:K , S;F|Q
[P]
n ) (36)
≤ I(W1:K , S;F|Q
[P]
n ) + I(W1:K , S;Q
[P]
n ) (37)
= I(W1:K , S;F , Q
[P]
n ) (38)
= 0 (39)
where (33) follows from the fact that the answer strings are deterministic functions of the
queries and the messages, and (39) follows from the independence of (W1:K , S,F) and (15).
Since mutual information cannot be negative, it must be equal to zero, and
H(A[P]n |WP , Q
[P]
n )−H(A
[P]
n |WP ,F , Q
[P]
n ) = I(A
[P]
n ;F|WP , Q
[P]
n ) = 0 (40)
completing the proof. 
Next, we need Lemma 3, which is an existence proof for index sets with specific prop-
erties. This technical lemma is needed in the proofs of upcoming two lemmas, Lemma 4
and Lemma 5. First, we give the definitions of relevant index sets Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd, and an
element im. Given P1 and P2, we divide P1 into two disjoint partitions Pa and Pb (i.e.,
Pa ∪ Pb = P1 and Pa ∩ Pb = ∅), where Pa ⊆ P2 (i.e., P1 ∩ P2 = Pa), Pb ⊆ P¯2. Suppose
|Pa| = M ∈ [1 : P − 1]. Note that since P1 6= P2, we cannot have M = P . We assume that
Pa = {i1, · · · , iM} for clarity of presentation. Given an arbitrary number m ∈ [1 : M ], we
define a new index set Pc = {i1, · · · , im} which consists of exactly the first m elements in the
index set Pa. Let im be the last element from the index set Pc. We obtain a new index set
Pd = {i1, · · · , im−1} after removing this element. That means Pc = Pd ∪ {im}. The relation
of all these mentioned index sets is shown in Fig. 4.
Lemma 3 For K ≥ 3, 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1, given index sets P1, P2 such that |Pi| = P for
i = 1, 2 and P1 6= P2, we can construct an index set P3 such that,
i) P3 6= P1 and P3 6= P2,
ii) |P3| = P , and
iii) P3 includes Pb ∪ Pd but does not include the common element im in P1 ∩ P2.
Proof: The key is to construct an index set Pe which satisfies the following two constraints:
Pe ⊆ [1 : K]\{Pb,Pc} and |Pe| = M − (m − 1). As we can see, |Pa\Pc| = M − m and
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Pc
Pd
Pe
Pb Pa
P1
P2
[1 : K]
Figure 4: The relation of the index sets presented in Lemma 3 and used in Lemmas 4 and 5.
|P2\Pa| ≥ 1. One way to construct the index set Pe is to include all the (M −m) elements
from the index set Pa\Pc and one more element from the index set P2\Pa, i.e.,
Pe = (Pa\Pc) ∪ {i∗} (41)
where i∗ ∈ P2\Pa. The index set Pe is generally not unique (for some examples, see Exam-
ples 1 and 2 below). Now, we are ready to construct the index set P3 as,
P3 = Pb ∪ Pd ∪ Pe (42)
Since Pb, Pd, Pe are disjoint sets, |P3| = |Pb|+|Pd|+|Pe| = (P−M)+(m−1)+(M−m+1) =
P . Thus, we are able to construct P3 such that |P3| = P . Based on the formulation of Pb,
Pd and Pe, these three index sets do not include the element im. Hence, im /∈ P3. Since both
P1 and P2 have the element im as im belongs to their intersection Pa, P3 is not the same as
P1 or P2, i.e., P3 6= P1, P3 6= P2 and |P3| = P . 
The following two examples illustrate the relations between the aforementioned sets,
which will be important for the converse proof through the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5.
Example 1 Suppose K = 3, P = 2 and N ≥ 2 is an arbitrary positive integer. The total
possible number of index sets is
(
K
P
)
= 3. Assume P1 = {1, 2}, P2 = {1, 3} without loss of
generality. Then, Pa = {1}, Pb = {2} and the corresponding M is 1. Thus, m can only take
the value 1. That means Pc = {1} and Pd has to be an empty set. For Pe, we cannot take
any element from the set Pa\Pc as it is empty, instead we can take the element 3 from the
set P2\Pa. Thus, Pe is formed as {3}, and we construct P3 = {2, 3}.
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Example 2 Suppose K = 6, P = 4 and N ≥ 2 is an arbitrary positive integer. The total
possible number of index sets is
(
K
P
)
= 15. Assume P1 = {1, 3, 5, 6}, P2 = {2, 3, 5, 6} without
loss of generality. Then, Pa = {3, 5, 6}, Pb = {1} and the corresponding M is 3. Thus, m
can take the values 1, 2 or 3. To avoid being repetitive, we only consider the cases of m = 2
or m = 3, which are different from Example 1.
When m = 2, Pc = {3, 5} and Pd = {3}. For Pe, we can take the element 6 from the
set Pa\Pc and then take the element 2 from the set P2\Pa. Alternatively, we can pick the
element 4 outside the union P1 ∪ P2 instead of the element 6 from the set Pa\Pc. Thus, Pe
is formed as {2, 6} (or {4, 6}). Therefore, we finally obtain P3 = {1, 2, 3, 6} (or {1, 3, 4, 6}).
When m = 3, Pc = {3, 5, 6} and Pd = {3, 5}. For Pe, we cannot take any element
from the set Pa\Pc since it is empty. We take the element 2 from the set P2\Pa or take the
element 4 outside the union P1 ∪ P2. Thus, Pe is formed as {2} (or {4}), and we construct
P3 = {1, 2, 3, 5} (or {1, 3, 4, 5}).
Next, we need the following lemma. Lemma 4 states that revealing any individual answer
given the messages (WPb ,WPd) does not leak any information about the message Wim.
Lemma 4 (Message leakage within any individual answer string) When 1 ≤ P ≤
K − 1 and M ≥ 1, for arbitrary m ∈ [1 :M ], the following equality is always true,
H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, Q
[P2]
n ) (43)
Remark 8 The goal of Lemma 4 is to prove a key step, equation (64), in the proof of
Lemma 5. We remark that Lemma 4 is true for any m ∈ [2 : M ] when M ≥ 1 as proved
below. In the case when m = 1, the messages set Wi1:im−1 (i.e., Pd) is an empty set and thus
Lemma 4 is still true in this case.
Proof: From the user privacy constraint (19), we have,
H(WPb ,WPc , A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(WPb,WPc , A
[P3]
n , Q
[P3]
n ) (44)
H(WPb ,WPd, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(WPb,WPd , A
[P3]
n , Q
[P3]
n ) (45)
Since Pc = Pd ∪ im, we have
H(Wim |WPb ,WPd, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, A
[P3]
n , Q
[P3]
n ) (46)
Similarly,
H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, Q
[P2]
n ) = H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
n ) (47)
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From the database privacy constraint (21), we have,
0 = I(WP¯3 ;A
[P3]
1:N , Q
[P3]
1:N ,F) (48)
= I(WP¯3 ;A
[P3]
1:N ,WP3 , Q
[P3]
1:N ,F) (49)
≥ I(WP¯3 ;A
[P3]
1:N ,WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
1:N ) (50)
≥ I(Wim ;A
[P3]
1:N ,WPb,WPd , Q
[P3]
1:N ) (51)
≥ I(Wim ;A
[P3]
n ,WPb,WPd , Q
[P3]
n ) (52)
= I(Wim ;A
[P3]
n |WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
n ) (53)
= H(Wim |WPb,WPd , Q
[P3]
n )−H(Wim|A
[P3]
n ,WPb ,WPd , Q
[P3]
n ) (54)
where (49) comes from the MM-SPIR reliability constraint (18), (50) comes from the rela-
tionship P3 = Pb∪Pd∪Pe (i.e, Pb∪Pd ⊆ P3), and (51) comes from the relationship im ∈ P¯3.
Thus, H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
n ) ≤ H(Wim|A
[P3]
n ,WPb ,WPd , Q
[P3]
n ). This concludes the proof
by observing that H(Wim|WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
n ) ≥ H(Wim |A
[P3]
n ,WPb ,WPd, Q
[P3]
n ) trivially as con-
ditioning cannot increase entropy. 
Finally, the following lemma states that conditioning on an undesired message set does
not decrease the uncertainty on any individual answer string. This is a consequence of the
database privacy constraint.
Lemma 5 (Effect of conditioning on an undesired message set)
H(A[P2]n |WP1 , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ), ∀n, ∀P1,P2 s.t. P1 6= P2, |P1| = |P2| (55)
Remark 9 We note that although Lemma 5 has the same flavor as [8, eqn. (39)], the proof is
much more involved. The main reason for this difficulty is the inter-relations between subsets
of messages of size P . Specifically, in SM-SPIR, all message subsets are of size P = 1, and
therefore, they are disjoint. However, in MM-SPIR, the message subsets are of size P , and
they intersect in general, i.e., for a given P1, P2 such that |P1| = |P2| = P , the intersection
P1 ∩P2 is not an empty set in general in contrast to SM-SPIR. Dealing with message subset
intersections is the essence of introducing and proving Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
Proof: From the database privacy constraint (21), we have,
0 = I(WP¯2 ;A
[P2]
1:N , Q
[P2]
1:N ,F) (56)
≥ I(WP¯2 ;A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (57)
≥ I(WPb ;A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (58)
= I(WPb ;A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) (59)
= H(WPb |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPb|A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (60)
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where (58) comes from the relationship Pb ⊆ P¯2, (59) follows from the independence of
messages and queries. Hence, H(WPb |Q
[P2]
n ) = H(WPb |A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) as the reverse implication
follows form the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy.
Case 1: M = 0: In this case, there is no intersection between P1 and P2. WPa is an empty
set of messages and then WP1 =WPb . Hence,
I(WP1 ;A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) = I(WPb ;A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) = 0 (61)
where (61) follows from (59). This proves (55), the claim of lemma, when M = 0.
Case 2: M ≥ 1: In this case, WP1 =WPa ∪WPb and WPa = {Wi1 , · · · ,WiM}.
H(WPa |WPb , A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) = H(Wi1:iM |WPb, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (62)
= H(Wi1 |WPb, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) +H(Wi2|Wi1 ,WPb, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n )
+ · · ·+H(WiM |Wi1:iM−1,WPb, A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (63)
= H(Wi1 |WPb, Q
[P2]
n ) +H(Wi2|Wi1 ,WPb, Q
[P2]
n )
+ · · ·+H(WiM |Wi1:iM−1,WPb, Q
[P2]
n ) (64)
= H(Wi1:iM |WPb, Q
[P2]
n ) (65)
= H(WPa |WPb , Q
[P2]
n ) (66)
where (64) comes from the direct application of Lemma 4.
Thus, we have,
I(WP1 ;A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) = H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WP1|A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (67)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPa,WPb |A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (68)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPb|A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPa |WPb , A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) (69)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPb|Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPa |WPb , Q
[P2]
n ) (70)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WPa,WPb |Q
[P2]
n ) (71)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n )−H(WP1|Q
[P2]
n ) (72)
= 0 (73)
where (70) follows from (60) and (66). This proves (55), the claim of lemma, when M ≥ 1.
Combining (61) and (73) proves (55) in all cases completing the proof. 
Remark 10 The intuition behind Lemma 5 is as follows: If the pair (A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) provide
any information about WP1, they have to provide some information about WP¯1 under the
user privacy constraint. However, database privacy constraint is thus obviously violated if
the user receives any information about WP¯1. Consequently, the pair (A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) can never
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provide any information about WP¯1 . Therefore, we are able to derive H(WP1 |A
[P2]
n , Q
[P2]
n ) =
H(WP1)
(16)
= H(WP1 |Q
[P2]
n ), and hence I(WP1 ;A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) = 0.
Now, we are ready to construct the main body of the converse proof for MM-SPIR, as
well as the minimal entropy of common randomness required to achieve perfect MM-SPIR.
Since we dealt with the inter-relations between message subsets in the previous lemmas and
reached similar conclusions to those in SM-SPIR [8], the main body of the converse proof
will be similar in structure to its counterpart in SM-SPIR.
The proof for R ≤ CMM−SPIR:
PL = H(WP1) (74)
= H(WP1 |F) (75)
= H(WP1 |F)−H(WP1|A
[P1]
1:N ,F) (76)
= I(WP1 ;A
[P1]
1:N |F) (77)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
1:N |WP1 ,F) (78)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
1:N |WP1 ,F , Q
[P1]
n ) (79)
≤ H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
n |WP1,F , Q
[P1]
n ) (80)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
n |WP1 , Q
[P1]
n ) (81)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P2]
n |WP1 , Q
[P2]
n ) (82)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P2]
n |Q
[P2]
n ) (83)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
n |Q
[P1]
n ) (84)
≤ H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
n |Q
[P1]
n ,F) (85)
= H(A
[P1]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P1]
n |F) (86)
where (75) follows from the independence of the user’s private randomness and the messages,
(76) follows from the MM-SPIR reliability constraint (18), (79) follows from the fact that
the queries are deterministic functions of the user’s private randomness F (15), (81) follows
from Lemma 2, (82) follows from the first part of Lemma 1, (83) follows from Lemma 5, (84)
follows from the second part Lemma 1, and (86) again follows from the fact that the queries
are deterministic functions of the user’s private randomness F (15).
By summing (86) up for all n ∈ [1 : N ] and letting P denote the general desired index
set, we obtain,
NPL ≤ NH(A
[P]
1:N |F)−
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |F) (87)
≤ NH(A
[P]
1:N |F)−H(A
[P]
1:N |F) (88)
= (N − 1)H(A
[P]
1:N |F) (89)
19
≤ (N − 1)
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |F) (90)
≤ (N − 1)
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n ) (91)
which leads to the desired converse result on the retrieval rate,
R =
PL∑N
n=1H(A
[P]
n )
≤
N − 1
N
= 1−
1
N
(92)
The proof for H(S) ≥ PL
N−1
:
0 = I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
1:N , Q
[P1]
1:N ,F) (93)
≥ I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
1:N ,F) (94)
= I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
1:N ,WP1 ,F) (95)
= I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
1:N |WP1 ,F) (96)
≥ I(WP¯1 ;A
[P1]
n |WP1 ,F) (97)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)−H(A
[P1]
n |W1:K ,F) (98)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)−H(A
[P1]
n |W1:K ,F) +H(A
[P1]
n |W1:K ,F , S) (99)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)− I(S;A
[P1]
n |W1:K ,F) (100)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)−H(S|W1:K,F) +H(S|A
[P1]
n ,W1:K ,F) (101)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)−H(S) +H(S|A
[P1]
n ,W1:K ,F) (102)
≥ H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F)−H(S) (103)
= H(A[P1]n |WP1 ,F , Q
[P1]
n )−H(S) (104)
= H(A[P1]n |Q
[P1]
n )−H(S) (105)
where (93) follows from the database privacy constraint (21), (95) follows from the MM-SPIR
reliability constraint (18), (99) follows from the fact that the answer strings are deterministic
functions of messages and queries which are also functions of the randomness F as in (15)
and (17), (102) follows from the independence of the common randomness, messages, and
user’s private randomness as in (14), (104) follows from (15), and (105) follows from the
steps between (81)-(84) by applying Lemma 1, 2 and 5 again.
By summing (105) up for all n ∈ [1 : N ] and letting P denote the general desired index
set again, we obtain,
0 ≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[P]n |Q
[P]
n )−NH(S) (106)
≥ H(A
[P]
1:N |Q
[P]
n )−NH(S) (107)
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≥ H(A
[P]
1:N |Q
[P]
n ,F)−NH(S) (108)
= H(A
[P]
1:N |F)−NH(S) (109)
≥
N
N − 1
PL−NH(S) (110)
where (109) follows from (15) and (110) follows from (89), which leads to a lower bound for
the minimal required entropy of common randomness S,
H(S) ≥
PL
N − 1
(111)
5.4 MM-SPIR: Achievability Proof
Since the MM-SPIR capacity is the same as the SM-SPIR capacity, and the required common
randomness is P times the required common randomness for SM-SPIR, we can use the
achievable scheme in [8] successively P times in a row (by utilizing independent common
randomness each time) to achieve the MM-SPIR capacity. Although the query structure for
the capacity-achieving scheme for SPIR in [8] is quite simple, it is fundamentally different
than the query structure for the capacity-achieving scheme for PIR in [7]. This means
that user/databases should execute different query structures for different database privacy
levels. In this paper, by combining ideas for achievability from [23] and [15], we propose an
alternative capacity-achieving scheme for MM-SPIR for any7 P . Our achievability scheme
enables us to switch between MM-PIR and MM-SPIR seamlessly, and therefore support
different database privacy levels, as the basic query structures are similar. We start with
two motivating examples in Section 5.4.1, give the general achievable scheme in Section 5.4.2,
and calculate its rate and required common randomness amount in Section 5.4.3.
For convenience, we use the k-sum notation in [7, 23]. A k-sum is a sum of k symbols
from k different messages. Thus, a k-sum symbol appears only in round k. We denote the
number of stages in round k by αk, which was originally introduced in [23]. In addition, we
use ν to denote the number of repetitions of the scheme8 in [23] we need before we start
assigning common randomness symbols.
5.4.1 Motivating Examples
Example 3 Consider the case K = 3, P = 1, N = 3. Our achievable scheme is as follows:
First, we generate an initial query table, which strictly follows the query table generation
in [23]. For this case, from [23], we obtain the number of stages needed in each round as
α1 = 1, α2 = 2, α3 = 4. From the perspective of a database, before the assignment of common
7We note that the capacity-achieving scheme for K = P is simply to download all messages from one of
the databases, hence, without loss of generality, we focus on the case 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1 in this section.
8 When we refer to the scheme in [23], we refer to the near-optimal scheme in [23] which was introduced
for K/P ≥ 2. Reference [23] has a different, optimal, scheme for K/P ≤ 2. However, in this paper, even
when K/P ≤ 2, we still refer to (and use) the near-optimal scheme in [23].
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randomness symbols begins, the total number of downloaded desired symbols in round 1 is
α1P = 1 × 1 = 1. Thus, we need 1 previously downloaded common randomness symbol for
this desired symbol. Since this common randomness symbol needs to come from the other
N − 1 = 2 databases, the required common randomness to be downloaded from each database
is 1
2
symbols (assuming a symmetric scheme that distributes downloads equally over the other
2 databases). Thus, in order to obtain an integer number of common randomness symbols
to be downloaded from each database, we repeat the scheme in [23] two times (i.e., ν = 2)
before we begin assigning the common randomness symbols. Hence, the number of stages in
each round become ναk = 2αk, for k = 1, 2, 3. That is we have 2 stages of 1-sums, 4 stages
of 2-sums and 8 stages of 3-sums; see Table 1.
Database 1 Database 2 Database 3
s1 s2 s3
a1 + s2 a3 + s1 a5 + s1
a2 + s3 a4 + s3 a6 + s2
b1 + s4 b3 + s8 b5 + s12
b2 + s5 b4 + s9 b6 + s13
c1 + s6 c3 + s10 c5 + s14
c2 + s7 c4 + s11 c6 + s15
a7 + b3 + s8 a15 + b1 + s4 a23 + b1 + s4
a8 + b4 + s9 a16 + b2 + s5 a24 + b2 + s5
a9 + b5 + s12 a17 + b5 + s12 a25 + b3 + s8
a10 + b6 + s13 a18 + b6 + s13 a26 + b4 + s9
a11 + c3 + s10 a19 + c1 + s6 a27 + c1 + s6
a12 + c4 + s11 a20 + c2 + s7 a28 + c2 + s7
a13 + c5 + s14 a21 + c5 + s14 a29 + c3 + s10
a14 + c6 + s15 a22 + c6 + s15 a30 + c4 + s11
b7 + c7 + s16 b11 + c11 + s20 b15 + c15 + s24
b8 + c8 + s17 b12 + c12 + s21 b16 + c16 + s25
b9 + c9 + s18 b13 + c13 + s22 b17 + c17 + s26
b10 + c10 + s19 b14 + c14 + s23 b18 + c18 + s27
a31 + b11 + c11 + s20 a39 + b7 + c7 + s16 a47 + b7 + c7 + s16
a32 + b12 + c12 + s21 a40 + b8 + c8 + s17 a48 + b8 + c8 + s17
a33 + b13 + c13 + s22 a41 + b9 + c9 + s18 a49 + b9 + c9 + s18
a34 + b13 + c14 + s23 a42 + b10 + c10 + s19 a50 + b10 + c10 + s19
a35 + b15 + c15 + s24 a43 + b15 + c15 + s24 a51 + b11 + c11 + s20
a36 + b16 + c16 + s25 a44 + b16 + c16 + s25 a52 + b12 + c12 + s21
a37 + b17 + c17 + s26 a45 + b17 + c17 + s26 a53 + b13 + c13 + s22
a38 + b18 + c18 + s27 a46 + b18 + c18 + s27 a54 + b14 + c14 + s23
Table 1: The query table for the case K = 3, P = 1, N = 3.
We are now ready to start assigning the common randomness symbols. We first down-
load 1 common randomness symbol from each database; for instance, we download s1 from
database 1. In round 1, we mix (i.e., add) a common randomness symbol to each 1-sum. All
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the common randomness symbols at each database should be distinct; for instance, observe
that, we add s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 at database 1. Second, the common randomness symbols added
to the desired symbols (a symbols in this example) must be downloaded from other databases;
for instance, note that s2 and s3 added to symbols a1 and a2 are downloaded from databases
2 and 3. Note that the indices of the common randomness symbols added to the undesired
symbols (symbols b and c) increase cumulatively, e.g., s4, s5, s6, s7 at database 1 in round 1,
and these symbols are not separately downloaded by the user.
In round 2, for every 2-sum containing a desired message symbol, we add a side informa-
tion symbol downloaded from another database which already contains a common randomness
symbol; for instance, we add b3 + s8 that is already downloaded from database 2, to the de-
sired symbol a7 at database 1, i.e., we download a7 + b3 + s8. On the other hand, for every
2-sum not containing any desired message symbols, we add a new distinct common random-
ness symbol with a cumulatively increasing index; for instance, for the download b7 + c7
from database 1, we add s16 which is a new non-downloaded common randomness symbol,
and download b7 + c7 + s16. Finally, in round 3, where we download 3-sums, and hence
every download contains a desired symbol, we add the side information generated at other
databases; for instance, we add b11+ c11+ s20 downloaded from database 2, to a31 and down-
load a31 + b11 + c11 + s20. This completes the achievable scheme for this case. The complete
query table is shown in Table 1.
Now, we calculate the rate of this scheme. The length of each message is L = 54, and the
total number of downloads is D = 81. Thus, the rate R of this scheme is 54
81
= 2
3
= 1− 1
3
, which
matches the capacity expression. In addition, we used 27 common randomness symbols, hence
the required common randomness H(S) is 27 = 54
2
, which matches the required minimum.
Example 4 Consider the case K = 5, P = 3, N = 2. Our achievable scheme is as follows:
Again, first, we generate an initial query table, which strictly follows the query table gener-
ation in [23]. Note that, we still use the near-optimal scheme in [23], even though for this
case K/P ≤ 2 (see Footnote 8). For this case, from [23], we obtain the number of stages
needed in each round as α1 = 3, α2 = 1, α3 = α4 = 0 and α5 = 1. In this case, from
the perspective of a database, before the assignment of common randomness symbols begins,
the total number of downloaded desired symbols in round 1 is α1P = 3 × 3 = 9. Thus, we
need 9 previously downloaded common randomness symbols for these desired symbols. These
common randomness symbols need to come from the other N − 1 = 1 database. In this case,
since 9/1 = 9 is an integer already, we do not need to repeat the scheme unlike the case
in Example 3. Thus, ν = 1 here, there is no need for repetition, and the underlying query
structure before adding common randomness symbols is exactly the same as [23]; see Table 2.
We are now ready to start assigning the common randomness symbols. We first download
9 common randomness symbols from each database; for instance, we download s1, · · · , s9 from
database 1. In round 1, we add a common randomness symbol to each 1-sum. All the common
randomness symbols at each database should be distinct; for instance, observe that, we add
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s10, · · · , s24 at database 1. Second, the common randomness symbols added to the desired
symbols (a, b, c symbols in this example) must be downloaded from the other databases; for
instance, note that s10, · · · , s18 added to symbols a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2, a3, b3, c3 are downloaded
from database 2. Note that the indices of the common randomness symbols added to the
undesired symbols (symbols d and e) increase cumulatively, e.g., s19 · · · , s24 at database 1 in
round 1, and these symbols are not separately downloaded by the user.
Database 1 Database 2
s1, s2, s3 s10, s11, s12
s4, s5, s6 s13, s14, s15
s7, s8, s9 s16, s17, s18
s31, s32, s33 s34, s35, s36
a1 + s10 a4 + s1
b1 + s11 b4 + s2
c1 + s12 c4 + s3
d1 + s19 d4 + s25
e1 + s20 e4 + s26
a2 + s13 a5 + s4
b2 + s14 b5 + s5
c2 + s15 c5 + s6
d2 + s21 d5 + s27
e2 + s22 e5 + s28
a3 + s16 a6 + s7
b3 + s17 b6 + s8
c3 + s18 c6 + s9
d3 + s23 d6 + s29
e3 + s24 e6 + s30
a7 + b4 + s34 a10 + b1 + s31
a4 + c7 + s35 a1 + c10 + s32
a8 + d4 + s25 a11 + d1 + s19
a9 + e4 + s26 a12 + e1 + s20
b7 + c4 + s36 b10 + c1 + s33
b8 + d5 + s27 b11 + d2 + s21
b9 + e5 + s28 b12 + e2 + s22
c8 + d6 + s29 c11 + d3 + s23
c9 + e6 + s30 c12 + e3 + s24
d7 + e7 + s37 d8 + e8 + s38
a13 + b5 + c5 + d8 + e8 + s38 a2 + b13 + c2 + d7 + e7 + s37
Table 2: The query table for the case K = 5, P = 3, N = 2.
In round 2, for every 2-sum containing only one desired message symbol, we add a side
information symbol downloaded from the other database which already contains a common
randomness symbol; for instance, we add d4 + s25 that is already downloaded from database
2, to the desired bit a8 at database 1, i.e., we download a8+ d4+ s25. On the other hand, for
every 2-sum containing two of the desired message symbols, we add a new distinct common
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randomness symbol and download it separately from the other database; for instance, for the
download a7 + b4 from database 1, we add s34 and download s34 separately from database 2,
and download a7+ b4 + s34. Therefore, for this, we need to download 3 common randomness
symbols (s34, s35, s36) from database 2. Further, for every 2-sum not containing any desired
message symbols, we add a new distinct common randomness symbol with a cumulatively
increasing index; for instance, for the download d7 + e7 from database 1, we add s37 which
is a new non-downloaded common randomness symbol, and download b7 + c7 + s37. We skip
rounds 3 and 4 because α3 = α4 = 0. Finally, in round 5, where we download 5-sums, we
add the side information generated at the other databases; for instance, we add d8+ e8 + s38
downloaded from database 2, to a13+ b5+ c5 and download a13+ b5+ c5+ d8+ e8+ s38. This
completes the achievable scheme for this case. The complete query table is shown in Table 2.
Now, we calculate the rate of this scheme. We downloaded 13 a symbols, 13 b symbols
and 12 c symbols, hence a total of L = 38 desired symbols. The total number of downloads
is D = 76. Thus, the rate R of this scheme is 38
76
= 1
2
= 1 − 1
2
, which matches the capacity
expression. In addition, we used 38 common randomness symbols, hence the required common
randomness H(S) is 38 = 38
1
, which matches the required minimum.
We finally note that, since we downloaded asymmetric number of symbols from desired
messages, i.e., 13 a symbols, 13 b symbols and 12 c symbols, we can repeat this scheme 3
times changing the roles of a, b and c, and have a symmetric scheme where we download 38
a symbols, 38 b symbols and 38 c symbols. This will not change the normalized download cost
and normalized downloaded common randomness symbol numbers, hence, all the calculations
(rate and common randomness calculations) will remain the same.
5.4.2 General Achievable Scheme
Our achievability scheme is primarily based on the one in [23], with the addition of down-
loading and/or mixing common randomness variables into symbol downloads appropriately.
We note that, here we extend the near-optimal algorithm in [23], which was originally pro-
posed for P ≤ K
2
, to the case of P ≥ K
2
, and therefore, use it for all 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1 (see
Footnote 8). Our achievability scheme comprises the following steps:
1. Initial MM-PIR Query Generation: Generate an initial query table strictly following
the near-optimal procedure in [23] for arbitrary K, P and N .
2. Repetition: Repeat Step 1 for a total of ν times. The purpose of the repetition is
to i) get an integer number of common randomness generated at each database by
a symmetric algorithm (as exemplified in Example 3), and ii) get equal number of
symbols downloaded from each desired message (as exemplified in Example 4). Let ν0
be the smallest integer such that (N−1)
K−PNν0
P
(i.e., αKNν0
P
) is an integer. Similarly, for
1 ≤ k ≤ min{P,K − P}, let νk be the smallest integer such that
(P
k
)αkνk
N−1
is an integer
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(k ≤ K − P comes from αK−P+1 = · · · = αP−1 = 0 in [23, eqn. (51)]). Then, choose ν
as the lowest common multiple of these νk, where k ∈ [0 : min{P,K − P}].
3. Common Randomness Assignment: Assign the common randomness as follows:
(a) In round 1, assign νPα1
N−1
independent common randomness symbols to each
database, and download them. At each database, mix every 1-sum symbol con-
taining a desired message symbol with an arbitrary common randomness symbol
already downloaded from another database, making sure that every 1-sum sym-
bol at each database is mixed with a different common randomness symbol. Mix
all other 1-sum symbols not containing a desired symbol with a new common
randomness symbol which is not downloaded by the user.
(b) In round k (k ≥ 2), assign
ν(P
k
)αk
N−1
independent common randomness symbols to
each database, and download them. At each database: Mix every k-sum symbol
containing only desired message symbols with an arbitrary common randomness
symbol already downloaded from another database. Mix every k-sum symbol con-
taining p desired message symbols (1 ≤ p ≤ k− 1) with the common randomness
symbol from the (k − p)-sum symbol having the same k − p undesired message
symbols downloaded at any other database. Mix every k-sum symbol not contain-
ing any desired message symbols with a new common randomness symbol which
is not downloaded by the user.
(c) Repeat Step 3b until k reaches K. Note that if αk = 0, nothing is done.
This scheme inherits the user privacy property from the underlying scheme in [23], as
the new common randomness symbols, which are separately downloaded and subtracted
out, make no difference. Due to the procedure in Step 3, where non-downloaded common
randomness symbols are added to the downloads, no undesired symbol is decodable because
of the added unknown common randomness, ensuring the database privacy constraint.
5.4.3 Rate and Common Randomness Amount Calculation
We calculate the achievable rate and the minimal required common randomness for only one
repetition of the scheme. The reason for this is that, in every repetition, every involved term
would be multiplied by T , and thus T can be cancelled in the numerator and the denominator
of the normalized rate and normalized required common randomness expressions.
For each database, before the assignment of common randomness, let D1 be the total
number of downloaded symbols, U1 be the total number of downloaded undesired symbols,
U2 be the total number of downloaded symbols including only desired message symbols, and
D2 be the total number of downloaded common randomness symbols. The achievable rate
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is then given by,
R =
D1 − U1
D1 +D2
(112)
Using the respective results in [23, eqns. (66)-(69) and (70)-(72)], we have
D1 =
K∑
k=1
(
K
k
)
αk =
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)K
− 1
]
(113)
U1 =
K−P∑
k=1
(
K − P
k
)
αk =
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)K−P
− 1
]
(114)
In the proposed new achievable scheme, every k-sum symbol (1 ≤ k ≤ min{P,K − P})
containing only desired message symbols is mixed with an arbitrary common randomness
symbol which is downloaded from another database. In addition, these downloaded common
randomness symbols are uniformly requested from the other (N − 1) databases. Thus,
U2 =
min{K−P,P}∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk (115)
D2 =
1
N − 1
U2 =
1
N − 1
min{K−P,P}∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk (116)
With these observations we have the following two lemmas where we compute the MM-
SPIR rate and the required common randomness amount.
Lemma 6 The rate of the proposed achievable scheme is,
R = 1−
1
N
(117)
Proof: We first calculate D2 in two possible settings. When P ≤
K
2
, i.e., P ≤ K − P ,
D2 =
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk (118)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
) P∑
i=1
γir
K−P−k
i (119)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
P∑
i=1
(
P
k
)
γir
K−P−k
i (120)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
γir
K−P−k
i (121)
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=
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
γir
K−2P
i
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
rP−ki (122)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
γir
K−2P
i (N − 1)r
P
i (123)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i (N − 1) (124)
where (123) follows because ri is a root of the characteristic equation [23, eqn. (59)].
When K
2
≤ P ≤ K − 1, i.e., K − P ≤ P ,
D2 =
1
N − 1
K−P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk (125)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk −
P∑
k=K−P+1
(
P
k
)
αk (126)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk (127)
=
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i (N − 1) (128)
where (127) follows because αK−P+1 = · · · = αP−1 = 0 due to [23, eqn. (51)], and (128)
follows from (124).
Therefore, from (124) and (128), for all P , where 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1, we always have
D2 =
1
N − 1
P∑
k=1
(
P
k
)
αk =
1
N − 1
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i (N − 1) (129)
Now, in order to show that R = D1−U1
D1+D2
= 1 − 1
N
, we need to equivalently show that
D1 = NU1 + (N − 1)D2. Thus, we proceed as,
NU1 + (N − 1)D2 = N
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)K−P
− 1
]
+
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i (N − 1) (130)
=
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[
N
(
1 +
1
ri
)K−P
−N +N − 1
]
(131)
=
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[
N
(
1 +
1
ri
)K−P
− 1
]
(132)
=
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[
N
(
1 +
1
ri
)−P (
1 +
1
ri
)K
− 1
]
(133)
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=
P∑
i=1
γir
K−P
i
[(
1 +
1
ri
)K
− 1
]
(134)
= D1 (135)
where (134) follows because N(1 + 1
ri
)−P = 1, which comes from [23, eqn. (62)]. 
Lemma 7 The minimal required common randomness in the proposed achievable scheme is,
H(S) =
PL
N − 1
(136)
Proof: In our proposed scheme, at each database, a new common randomness symbol is
employed only in two cases. The first case is when a new common randomness symbol
is added to a k-sum symbol that contains only desired message symbols. In this case,
the common randomness symbols are equally distributed over the (N − 1) databases and
downloaded from them. The second case is when a new common randomness symbol is
assigned to a k-sum symbol that does not contain any desired message symbol. In this case,
the common randomness symbols are not downloaded. Therefore, we count the total number
of distinct common randomness symbols as H(S) = U1+D2. We note that L can be written
as 1
P
(D1 − U1). Thus,
PL
N − 1
=
P
P
(D1 − U1)
N − 1
(137)
=
D1 − U1
N − 1
(138)
=
NU1 + (N − 1)D2 − U1
N − 1
(139)
=
(N − 1)U1 + (N − 1)D2
N − 1
(140)
= U1 +D2 (141)
= H(S) (142)
where (139) comes from (135), i.e., D1 = NU1 + (N − 1)D2. 
6 MM-LSPIR: Arbitrary Message Lengths
Since the message sizes in the PSI problem are given and fixed, in particular, they are fixed
to be 1 (as the incidence vectors are composed 0s and 1s), we need to determine the capacity
of MM-SPIR with a given and fixed message size L. We call this setting MM-LSPIR. The
capacity of MM-LSPIR is given in the next theorem.
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Theorem 3 The MM-LSPIR capacity for N ≥ 2, K ≥ 2, and P ≤ K, for an arbitrary
message length L is given by,
CMM−LSPIR =


1, P = K
PL⌈
NPL
N−1
⌉ , 1 ≤ P ≤ K − 1, H(S) ≥ ⌈ PL
N−1
⌉
0, otherwise
(143)
We give the converse of Theorem 3 in Section 6.1, the achievability in Section 6.2, and
map MM-LSPIR back to PSI in Section 6.3.
6.1 MM-LSPIR: Converse Proof
From the converse proof of Theorem 2, using (22) and (92), we have
RMM−SPIR =
H(WP)∑N
n=1H(A
[P]
n )
=
PL
D
≤
N − 1
N
= 1−
1
N
(144)
where the download cost is D =
∑N
n=1H(A
[P]
n ).
We note that, for an arbitrary finite fixed message length L, the download cost D must
be a positive integer, as we download symbols in the same field as the message symbols.
Thus, with a careful look at going from (91) to (92), we have,
D ≥
⌈
NPL
N − 1
⌉
(145)
and therefore, the converse result for a finite and fixed L, is
RMM−LSPIR =
PL
D
≤
PL⌈
NPL
N−1
⌉ (146)
Similarly, the entropy of common randomness must also be a positive integer, as the
common randomness symbols are picked uniformly and independently from the same field
as the message symbols. Thus, with a careful look at going from (110) to (111), we have,
H(S) ≥
⌈
PL
N − 1
⌉
(147)
Therefore, (146) and (147) constitute the converse for Theorem 3.
6.2 MM-LSPIR: Achievability Proof
For simplicity, we follow the achievability scheme in [8, Section IV.B.1]. By setting the value
of lK to be 1 and using the total length of multi-messages PL to replace the length of a
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single message L, we get the achievability of MM-LSPIR directly with D =
⌈
NPL
N−1
⌉
and
H(S) =
⌈
PL
N−1
⌉
. These constitute the achievability for Theorem 3. The achievability can
also be done by using an extension of our proposed alternative achievable scheme.
6.3 Mapping MM-LSPIR Back to PSI
Finally, we map our MM-SPIR results back to the PSI problem to obtain Theorem 1. Recall
that, in the PSI problem, by generating the sets P1 and P2 by i.i.d. drawing the elements
from the alphabet Palph, we obtain i.i.d. messages in the corresponding MM-SPIR problem.
Further, by choosing the probability qi of choosing each element to be included in the set Pi
to be qi =
1
2
, for i = 1, 2, we obtain uniformly distributed messages, with message size L = 1.
Therefore, the PSI problem is equivalent to an MM-LSPIR problem with L = 1. Now, using
Theorem 3 with L = 1, we obtain the ultimate result of this paper in Theorem 1.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
We investigated the PSI problem over a finite field FK from an information-theoretic point of
view. We showed that the problem can be recast as an MM-SPIR problem with message size
1. This is under the assumption that the sets (or their corresponding incidence vectors) can
be stored in replicated and non-colluding databases. Further, the set elements are generated
in an i.i.d. fashion with a probability 1
2
of adding any element to any of the sets.
To that end, we explored the information-theoretic capacity of MM-SPIR as a stand-
alone problem. We showed that joint multi-message retrieval does not outperform successive
application of single-message SPIR. This is unlike the case of MM-PIR, where significant
performance gains can be obtained due to joint retrieval. We remark that SM-SPIR is a
special case of the problem studied in this paper by plugging P = 1. For the converse proof,
we extended the proof techniques of [8] to the setting of multi-messages. In particular, the
proof of Lemma 5 is significantly more involved than the proof in [8]. This is due to the
fact that the desired message subsets in case of MM-SPIR may not be disjoint. To unify the
query structures of MM-PIR and MM-SPIR, we proposed a new capacity-achieving scheme
for any P as an alternative to the successive usage of the scheme in [8]. Our scheme primarily
consists of three steps: Exploiting the achievable scheme in [23], making necessary repetitions
to symmetrize the scheme, and adding the needed common randomness properly. The last
step is inspired by [15]. Based on these results, we showed that the optimal download cost
for PSI is min
{⌈
P1N2
N2−1
⌉
,
⌈
P2N1
N1−1
⌉}
.
Finally, we make a few remarks about assumptions made in this paper, and directions
for further research. In this work, we add elements to each set in an i.i.d. manner and with
probability 1
2
. This assumption is made for two reasons, first, to have i.i.d. incidence vectors,
therefore, i.i.d. messages in the MM-SPIR problem, and second, to have uniform messages
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to avoid the need for compressing the messages W1:K before/within retrieval. However, this
assumption may be restrictive, as with this assumption, the expected sizes of both sets
are K
2
. Even with keeping the i.i.d. generation assumption, the probability of adding each
element to set i could be generalized to be an arbitrary qi. In this more general case, the
expected sizes of the sets, Kq1 and Kq2, could be arbitrary. This may be done by using
appropriate compression before/during retrieval, but needs to be studied further. Regarding
the i.i.d. selection of elements, while this assumption is not needed from the achievability
side, it is needed for the converse proof. To overcome these restrictions, as future work, it
may be worthwhile to investigate the MM-SPIR problem with correlated messages. Finally,
our scheme is infeasible for N1 = N2 = 1 due to the capacity result for MM-SPIR. It
would be interesting to see if MM-SPIR can be made feasible with certain modifications
to the problem, e.g., side information, or alternatively, if PSI can be transformed to other
problems, in the case of a single-server.
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